Charles Zheng

Professor and Christopher J. Grimes Fellow in Microeconomic Theory

Research Interests

Auction Theory; Mechanism Design; Theory of the Core

Teaching Fields

Mechanism Design; General Equilibrium; Game Theory

Representative Publications

"Jump Bidding and Overconcentration in Decentralized Simultaneous Ascending Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, v76, n2, 648-664 (November 2012).

"Collusion via Resale" (joint with Rod Garratt and Thomas Troger), Econometrica, v77, n4, 1095-1136 (July 2009, Articles).

"Core Equivalence Theorem with Production" (joint with Siyang Xiong), Journal of Economic Theory, v137, n1, 246-270 (November 2007).

"Optimal Auction with Resale," Econometrica, v70, n6, 2197-2224 (November 2002, Articles).

Working Papers

"Existence of Monotone Pure-Strategy Equilibria in First-Price Auctions with Resale" (May 27, 2013)

"Goethe's Secret Reserve Price" (December 4, 2012)

"Polarization in competitive bidding" (February 9, 2012)

 

Also from this web page:

Courses

  • 2260A - Intermediate Microeconomics I
    Sections - 001/002
  • 9602B - Microeconomics II
    Section - 001